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Abstract
We study the eect of disclosure on information acquisition and transmission
in a dynamic reputation model. In each period, to make a report to a client,
an expert chooses between conducting a costly investigation or channeling a
message from an interest group. We show that not disclosing the source of
the expert's report may increase the frequency of investigation by the expert.
Nevertheless, it decreases the quality of the clients' decisions We demonstrate
that, however, when the importance of decisions vary across time, when the
interest groups are long-lived, or when the expert's clientele is growing in her
reputation, nondisclosure may improve the quality of the clients' decisions.
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zDepartment of Economics, Penn State University; e-mail: txm41@psu.edu.[O]ver the past decade, it's become clear that interactions between medical
device companies and surgeons often involve substantial payments, tak-
ing the form of consultant fees, educational grants, royalties, funding for
clinical trials, travel and gifts. ... It's not hard to see that these nancial
relationships create con
icts of interest, and can exert inappropriate in
u-
ence over medical decisions. ... If these physicians are essentially putting
their medical judgment up for sale, where does the patient's well-being t
into the equation?
Statement of Senator Herb Kohl, February 27, 2008
The public is misled by individuals who present themselves to be inde-
pendent, unbiased experts or reporters, but are actually shills promoting
a prepackaged corporate agenda. ... Shoddy practices make it dicult for
viewers to tell the dierence between news and propaganda.
Statement of FCC Commissioner Adelstein, August 14, 2006
1 Introduction
In June and July 2008, the New York Times reported that three prominent psy-
chiatrists at the Harvard Medical School and its aliated Massachusetts General
Hospital, Drs. Joseph Biederman, Timothy E. Wilens, and Thomas Spencer, have
underreported the consulting fees they have received from drug companies by amounts
of one million dollars or more. The case was brought to light by a congressional in-
vestigation initiated by Senator Charles Grassley of Iowa. The issue is particularly
controversial because the Harvard group's research has helped to popularize the use
of certain potent antipsychotic drugs, aecting the prots of the industry that has
paid the consulting fees.1
We do not have to look far to nd plenty of other high-prole cases in which
dierent types of opinion makers - researchers, consultants, investigative reporters,
and policy makers - fail to disclose either a con
ict of interest or direct in
uence on
their reports by a third party.2 Revelations about such con
icts of interests usually
1See the reports in the New York Times on June 8, 2008, [40], and July 12, 2008, [13].
2In April 2008, the New York Times [7] reported that a number of former military ocers,
who served as TV military analysts or contributors to newspaper opinion pages, had received paid
1trigger some form of investigation by a regulator, often followed by a policy initiative
or an enforcement action intended to improve disclosure or prevent payments from
third parties to opinion makers. It is a simple and natural regulatory response.3
On the other hand, the industry usually opposes these initiatives, citing a variety of
reasons, including potential for market self-regulation as well as possible distortions
and negative externalities created by the regulatory intervention.
In this paper, we want to clarify whether stricter disclosure of opinion makers'
interests and sources of reports can help improve the quality of the decisions made
by the public and, if so, under which conditions. There are three components to our
analysis. First, at a cost, the expert may use their training and prior knowledge to
acquire and distill information relevant to the specic circumstances of their clients
or audience. Second, instead of information acquisition, experts may take favors from
interested groups and promote their agenda.4 Third, reputation concerns are what
keeps the experts from acting myopically and ill serving their clients. We model
reputation concerns, in the spirit of Kreps and Wilson [45] and Milgrom and Roberts
[52], by introducing a truthful type who always conducts an independent investigation
and reports her ndings truthfully.
The interaction of these factors creates an eect that might have been overlooked
in the debate over stricter disclosure policy: the option to receive a payment from
a third party for distorting information, available under nondisclosure, increases the
value of reputation building for the expert, potentially leading to more information
trips and special privileges from the Pentagon; these former ocers made statements about the
progress of the Iraq war, without disclosing their current relationship with the Pentagon.In November
2007, the Washington Post revealed that manufacturers of toys, home appliances, and reworks had
repeatedly paid in full or in part for trips of the present and the former chiefs of the Consumer
Product Safety Commission. In 2006, two studies by a media watchdog organization, Center for
Media and Democracy, [28], [29], uncovered TV stations' \widespread and undisclosed" use of video
news releases prepared by public relations rms that are hired by corporations and government
agencies.
3In the case of drug companies and medical device manufactures, Senators Charles Grassley and
Herb Kohl have introduced legislation, Physician Payment Sunshine Act, to require manufacturers
of pharmaceutical drugs, devices, and biologics to disclose direct and indirect payments and gifts
they give to doctors and researchers. In the case of the Consumer Product Safety Commission, a
group of senators have indicated their support for a legislation to ban travel paid-for by the industry.
In the case of TV stations, the Federal Communication Commission has issued a ne to the Comcast
broadcasting company for the failure to disclose the source of its news.
4Our use of the phrase \interest group" is broader than the conventional one, for example, that
by Grossman and Helpman [39]. In addition to its apparent political annotation, we also use it to
refer, for example, to drug companies in their dealing with doctors.
2acquisition in equilibrium. This is because the third party is only willing to pay
an expert if she can sway public opinion and an expert is only able to sway public
opinion if she is reputable enough. As a result, although it is true that in the absence
of disclosure a reputable expert faces steeper incentives to cash in and distort her
reports, the expert also has stronger incentives to build reputation through acquiring
and reporting useful information in the rst place.
This observation raises the question of whether the stronger incentives to build
reputation in the absence of disclosure result in higher probability of correct actions
by the public. The diculty is that more information acquisition under nondisclosure
may not translate into better choices because the public might not want to follow the
expert's recommendations until the expert reaches high reputation.
We nd that the net eect of nondisclosure on the quality of the decisions by
the public could go either way: In the basic setup of our model, with stakes constant
across time and a short-lived interest group, the quality of decisions by the client
decreases under nondisclosure. At the same time, we point out a number of factors
that might lead to a positive eect of nondisclosure: clientele growing in reputation,
variable stakes of the interest group, and a long-lived interest group.
To the best of our knowledge, our paper is the rst to study the reputation of
experts in a repeated-games framework which considers both information acquisition
and information transmission. In a sense, we make the bias of the expert endogenous
by allowing her to be captured by an interest group. We also make a technical
contribution by providing a procedure that yields an explicit characterization of the
(stationary Markov perfect) equilibrium for any discount factor, which allows for
better understanding of the parties' behavior and provides sharp comparative statics
results. Our work is most related to the classic work of Sobel [64] and a forthcoming
paper by Durbin and Iyer [23]. We compare our paper with these and other existing
papers in more detail in Section 5.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we study the bench-
mark model. In Section 3, we consider three extensions of the basic model: variable
stakes of the interest group, long-lived interest group, and clientele that increases in
the expert's reputation. In Section 4, we look at the role of the assumption about the
existence of the truthful (behavioral) type in our model and investigate two possible
alternatives. In Section 5, we review related literature. In Section 6, we conclude.
Some of the results and proofs are provided in the appendix.
32 Benchmark model
In this section, we present the basic model and characterize its equilibria. In partic-
ular, we compare the properties of equilibria depending on whether the source of the
expert's report is disclosed.
2.1 Model
There are three players: an expert (she), a client (he), and an interest group (it).
There are innitely many periods. The expert is a long-lived player with a discount
factor  2 (0;1). The client and the interest group are short-lived players; they
maximize their current period payo. The interpretation of this assumption is that
the expert faces dierent clients and interest groups each time or that the client and
the interest groups are myopic and are not concerned about future interaction.5
 is realized;
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Figure 1: Timing of the stage game. Notation: E { the expert, C { the client, I { the
interest group. If the client does not pay the service fee to the expert, he does not
receive any report from the expert and takes optimal action given his prior.
The timing of the game played in each period is as follows (see Figure 1). First,
at the beginning of each period, the state of nature, , is realized. The state is a
random variable taking a value of either 0 or 1 and is independent across periods.
Let q be the probability of  = 1. We assume that
q < 1=2:
The state is not immediately observable to the expert, the client, or the interest
group.
After the state is realized, the expert announces a service fee, , upon which the
client decides whether to pay the fee and use the expert's service. If the client pays
the fee, the expert provides a report to the client. She can obtain the report from two
sources. First, it can obtain a report through investigation at cost c, which yields the
5In Section 3.2, we investigate what happens if the interest group is long-lived.
4true state with certainty. Alternatively, it can charge the interest group an access fee,
, and engage in propaganda by choosing the report prepared by the interest group.6
After the client observes the report, he takes an action y 2 f0;1g. We will consider
two versions of the game, with and without mandatory disclosure of the source of the
report to the client.
If the client does not use the expert's service, then he bases his action only on
his prior beliefs. At the end of each period, all players observe the true state, and the
current-period payos are realized. We also assume that beliefs about the credibility
of the expert are perfectly passed on to future generations of short-lived players.
The action taken by the client aects both his own and the interest group's
payo. The client prefers the action that matches the state of the nature and his





1; y = ;
0: otherwise,
The interest group prefers high actions and its utility function ~ U can be expressed
as
~ U(y) = y;
where   0 measures the interest group's stake on the issue. We assume, naturally,
the interest group always reports high state when approached by the expert. We
interpret it as deliberately assembled evidence in support of high action.
We also assume that both the client and the interest group's preferences are
quasilinear in money. Therefore, their payos are the utility functions dened as
above minus any fees they pay to the expert. The expert is not aected by the
client's action and maximizes her revenue from service fees and access fees net of the
costs of investigation.
We follow the adverse-selection approach to reputation. To model the expert's
credibility, we introduce the possibility of a truthful type which always chooses in-
vestigation. We further assume that this type will set the same fees as the strategic
6In reality, besides monetary payments, an expert can implicitly benet from privileges, access,
etc. For example, former generals described the treatments they received from the Pentagon in
\information sessions": \the uniformed escorts to Mr. Rumsfeld's private conference room, the best
government china laid out, the embossed name cards, the blizzard of PowerPoints, the solicitations
of advice and counsel, the appeals to duty and country, the warm thank you notes from the secretary
(of defense) himself." (See [7].)
5type.7 It is commonly known that the expert is of the truthful type with probability
p1 2 (0;1). We call p1 the prior reputation of the expert. The reputation of the
expert in period t is the probability with which the client believes it to be of the
truthful type, denoted by pt.
We view the truthful type as a modeling shortcut that helps us avoid issues not
central to our analysis. In Section 4.1, we replace the truthful type by a strategic
(payo) type who has a lower cost of investigation. We show that for some cost
parameters there exist equilibria observationally equivalent to the equilibria in the
model with the truthful type.
Later on, we show that the presence of a truthful type aects the behavior of
the parties, though it does not aect the strategic expert's prots when her initial
reputation is low. In particular, whenever the fees that can be collected by the expert
are smaller than the cost of investigation, information acquisition is impossible in the
model without the truthful type,8 while it is possible with that type.
Our solution concept is stationary Markov perfect equilibrium, in which the
Markov state is the client's belief about the type of the expert. In this equilibrium,
the past play may in
uence the future play only through the expert's reputation;
the players' actions must be independent of the other aspects of the history. The
equilibrium is stationary because the actions do not depend on the length of history
either.9 Finally, we focus on equilibria in which the expert sets the service and access
fees equal to the maximum willingness to pay of the parties. We will demonstrate
that equilibria that satisfy these conditions exist.
2.2 Disclosure
We start with analysis of the benchmark model in which the source of the report
is disclosed to the client. Our main interest is in the equilibria in which the expert
investigates with the highest probability so the client's decision is most likely to be
correct.
Imagine that in equilibrium the strategic expert investigates with probability 1.
Hence, the client will always take the correct action and achieve a payo of 1 if he
7Alternatively, one can assume that there is a set of types with every possible pricing strategy,
all of which are committed to investigation. Then, in each equilibrium the non-truthful type mimics
one of these commitment types.
8This result is shown in Section 4.2.
9See Section 5.5.2 of Mailath and Samuelson [50] for a denition of stationary Markov perfect
equilibrium. Although the game we study does not belong to the class of games considered therein,
their denition extends straightforwardly to our setting.
6uses the expert's service. On the other hand, the client will obtain a payo of 1   q
if he forgoes the expert's service and takes an action according to his prior beliefs.
In equilibrium, the expert will charge the service fee equal to the dierence of these
payos, q. Then, her expected payo equals




If the expert deviates and does not investigate, she will save the cost c, but has
to take the report from the interest group. Furthermore, because of disclosure this
deviation will be observed by the client. The strongest punishment for this deviation
is the continuation equilibrium in which the client ignores the reports of the expert
and the expert never investigates and thereby obtains the payo of 0. Hence, the
expert will nd it optimal to investigate with probability 1 if and only if c  v
or, equivalently, if the discounted value of the service fee is greater than the cost of
investigation, c  q.
Lemma 1. There exists an equilibrium in which the expert always chooses investiga-
tion on the equilibrium path if and only if c  q.
If c  q, the cost of investigation is greater than the maximal benet from
investigation, making it optimal for the expert to always choose propaganda.
Lemma 2. There exists an equilibrium in which the expert always chooses propaganda
if and only if c  q. Furthermore, there is no equilibrium in which the expert chooses
investigation with non-zero probability if c > q.
Proof. The proof of existence is straightforward. Let us prove uniqueness. Denote
by vt the continuation payo of the expert in period t. Consider an expert with zero
reputation, on or o the equilibrium path, in period t. As long as she investigates
with a positive probability, her reputation will remain zero regardless of her choice and
the realized state. Therefore, she would strictly prefer propaganda to investigation.
Hence, in equilibrium, she must investigate with probability zero and collect zero
fees. This behavior is supported by (out of equilibrium) beliefs about the type of
the expert that are never revised after the expert has revealed herself to be strategic.
Hence, vt = 0 if the expert is believed to be strategic.
Now consider an expert with positive reputation. Imagine that she chooses in-
vestigation in the current period t. If she never chooses propaganda in the future,
then vt+1 
q c
1 . If she chooses propaganda in period t + k + 1 and investigation in
the prior periods, then vt+k+2 = 0 and vt+1  1 k
1  (q   c) + kq. In either case, we
have  c + vt+1 < 0.
72.3 No disclosure
We now turn to the model in which the source of the report is not disclosed to the
client. Similar to the model with disclosure, if the cost of investigation is suciently





(1   q)(1   )
1   q
:
Lemma 3. There exists an equilibrium in which the expert always chooses investiga-
tion on the equilibrium path if and only if c  c.
Proof. The proof is straightforward and is skipped.
Observe that c is increasing in . Hence, similar to the model with disclosure,
perpetual investigation becomes sustainable for a larger set of costs as the expert
becomes more patient. At the same time, c < q, implying that perpetual investi-
gation is feasible for a smaller set of costs under no disclosure than under disclosure.
This is because without disclosure a deviation of the expert to propaganda remains
undetected whenever  = 1, making it more dicult to provide incentives for the
expert to choose investigation.
On the other hand, if the cost of investigation is suciently high, there is a









Lemma 4. There exists an equilibrium in which the expert always chooses propaganda
if and only if c  c. This equilibrium is unique if c > c.
Proof. The proof of existence is straightforward. The proof of uniqueness is analogous
to the proof in Lemma 2 and is skipped.
Consider now an environment in which the cost of investigation is medium,
c < c < c
:
Observe that c is decreasing in , and c is increasing in  and therefore the range
of costs that satises this condition is also increasing in .
In this environment, there is no equilibrium in which the expert chooses investi-
gation with probability 1. Nevertheless, as Proposition 1 below demonstrates, there
8exists an equilibrium in which the expert chooses investigation with a positive prob-
ability. Furthermore, the equilibrium is essentially unique. In this equilibrium, the
strategic expert randomizes between costly investigation and propaganda whenever
her reputation is low and non-zero. Costly investigation increases the future rep-
utation of the expert and, as a result, the expected future revenue from the fees
collected from the client and the interest group. In equilibrium, the current cost of
investigation is equal to the additional revenues expected in the future, which makes
randomization an equilibrium action. After the expert reaches high reputation, she
stops acquiring information and delivers reports received from the interest group.
We construct the equilibrium as follows. Let p denote the expert's reputation,
r(p) the probability with which the client believes this expert chooses costly inves-
tigation, and v(p) the expert's expected payo. Furthermore, denote by v1(p) and
v0(p) the continuation payo of the expert in the next period if she provides a correct
report in high and low state respectively. Finally, note that the payo of an expert
with reputation 0 is 0.10
Now, consider the incentives of the expert deciding between propaganda and
investigation. If the expert chooses propaganda, then she receives the access fee
from the interest group for the current period, (p;r). Therefore, the benet from
propaganda, net of the sunk service fee, is the sum of the access fee and the discounted
continuation payo after making a correct report in the high state,
P(p;r) = (p;r) + qv
1(p):
On the other hand, if the expert chooses investigation, she gets no access fee and
incurs the cost of investigation, c. Therefore, the benet from investigation is
I(p;r) =  c + qv
1(p) + (1   q)v
0(p):
Hence, the net benet of investigation relative to propaganda is the discounted value
of reputation after state 0 minus the investigation cost and the access fee,
L(p;r) =  c   (p;r) + (1   q)v
0(p):
Next, we demonstrate that if the expert's reputation is suciently high, p >
p, the net benet of investigation is negative and the expert will always choose
propaganda. This is done in two steps. First, we can bound from above the value of
payo v0. In the meantime, for the expert with a high reputation, the value of the
10This observation follows from an argument analogous to the one the proof of Lemma 2.
9access fee is very high, (p;r) = (1   q), which makes investigation unattractive.
This is ensured by the assumption c > c.
If the expert's reputation is low, p < p, she must mix and hence be indierent
between investigation and propaganda, L(p;r) = 0. Again, this can be shown in
two steps. First, it cannot be that the expert always chooses propaganda. This is
ensured by the assumption c < c and the continuation utility at reputation one,
as we have shown above that a reputation-one expert always chooses propaganda.
Next, it cannot be that the expert always chooses investigation: if this were the case,
her reputation would not change over time and her payos from investigation and
propaganda would be the same as those of the expert with reputation one; yet, the
expert with reputation one never chooses investigation in equilibrium.
We construct the rest of the equilibrium recursively. We know the behavior of the
expert with high reputation and hence the continuation payo v0 for all p 2 (p;1].
This allows us to nd pairs of p and r satisfying L(p;r) = 0 for some interval p 2
((p)2;p]. Next, we calculate the continuation payos for the expert with reputation
in this interval. This allows us to nd pairs of p and r satisfying L(p;r) = 0 and
continuation payos for another interval, and so on.




















(p)n +    1
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The value of v(p) is depicted in Figure 2.
In order to state the probability of investigation in the equilibrium, let ~ p be
the lower bound of the reputation levels for which the continuation payo is strictly
positive and n be the largest integer for which v(p) > 0 and p 2 ((p)n+1;(p)n). In
equilibrium, the expert's payo is 0 if her reputation is less than or equal to ~ p and
positive otherwise. The value of n is the equilibrium number of successes in low state
which are required for the expert with reputation p  ~ p to convince the client to
11If p = (p)n, n 2 f1;:::g, the payo depends on the probability with which the client follows
the expert's reports if her reputation is p = p. There could be multiple equilibria which dier in
this probability; we describe the set of probabilities for which the equilibrium exists in the body of
the proof of Proposition 1.
10-
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Figure 2: The horizontal axis represents the reputation. The vertical axis represents
the expert's payo. The parameters are: q = 1
4, c = 7
20,  = 0:95,  = 1:4.
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~ p ; if p < ~ p.
(2)
In particular, if the expert's initial reputation is low, p1 < ~ p, her reputation will jump
up to some value p 2 [~ p; ~ p=p] after the rst truthful report in low state. After that,
the reputation will grow exponentially increasing with each truthful report in low
state from p to p=p, until it reaches p.
Proposition 1. Let c < c < c. There exists an equilibrium. Furthermore, in any
equilibrium, (1) and (2) are satised. In addition, there exists an equilibrium in which
(1) and (2) are satised if c = c.
Proof. See the appendix.
2.4 Disclosure versus nondisclosure
Probability of correct decision. If the cost of investigation is intermediate, q < c < c,
the strategic expert chooses propaganda under disclosure, but may engage in costly
11investigation under no disclosure.12 Nevertheless, the client cannot benet from the
information acquired by the strategic expert under nondisclosure.
The intuition behind this result is as follows. Consider the game without dis-
closure. First, since the cost of investigation is relatively high, the expert with high
reputation, p > p, nds it strictly preferable to choose propaganda over investigation.
Yet, in equilibrium the client follows her reports. Second, the reports of the expert
with low reputation are of no value to the client even though the expert investigates
with a positive probability. To see this, observe that the value of future reputation
cannot be worth more for a low-reputation expert than for a high-reputation expert.
Thus, in order for a low-reputation expert to be willing to choose investigation, it
must be that the opportunity cost of investigation is lower for a low-reputation ex-
pert. Consequently, her in
uence over the public, which is positively related to the
interest group's access fee, must be lower than that of a high-reputation expert who
never investigates. The only way to achieve this in equilibrium is for her to choose
investigation with a probability that makes the client indierent about whether to
follow the expert's report.
We can also compare the eect of disclosure for other parameter constellations,
which gives the following result.
Remark 5. If c > c, the ex-ante expected probability of correct decision by the client
is higher under disclosure than under no disclosure. Otherwise, the ex-ante expected
probability of correct decision is the same under both types of policies.
Payo of the expert. If the cost of investigation is small, c < c, the expert
chooses investigation with certainty and obtains the same positive payo under any
disclosure regime.
Now, let c  c. Consider the game without disclosure. If c  c, the expert
always chooses propaganda in equilibrium and her service and access fees are 0, re-
sulting in zero prots. If c < c, the expert will attempt to build her reputation in
equilibrium. The only possibility to do so is to randomize between independent in-
vestigation and pushing the interest group's agenda. If the expert's initial reputation
is low, choice of propaganda results in zero prots: the expert has no in
uence on
the public and, hence, cannot collect positive revenues from the client or the inter-
est group. At the same time, in order to randomize the expert must be indierent
between propaganda and investigation. Therefore, the expected benet from costly
investigation, even if it results in more credibility and larger revenues in the future,
must be 0.
12We have that q < c if  or  are suciently large.
12By contrast, under disclosure the expert will obtain positive prots if c < q.
Therefore, if the initial reputation of the expert is low, her prot under no disclosure is
always lower than or equal to her prot under disclosure. Moreover, as c is decreasing
in the stake of the interest group, a higher value of  implies a larger set of the costs
for which the expert is worse o under no disclosure. The above discussion leads to
the following conclusion:
Remark 6. The prot of the expert with a suciently low reputation is greater un-
der disclosure if c < c < q and is equal to the prot under no disclosure otherwise.
Furthermore, the prot of the expert under no disclosure is non-increasing, and some-
times decreasing, in the stake of the interest group.
3 Extensions
In our model, nondisclosure decreases the quality of decisions made by the client. This
is so even when the incentives of the expert to acquire information are improved. In
equilibrium, the strategic expert does not acquire information frequently enough to
be useful for the client. This feature of equilibrium might, however, change if we
vary some of the assumptions of our model. In this section, we present three possible
extensions of the model, in which the results of the previous section are reversed and
the quality of the client's decisions may be higher under no disclosure.
3.1 Variable importance of issues
First, we look at a setting in which the stake of the interest group varies over periods.
In such an environment, the expert could nd it optimal to acquire information with
certainty when the stakes are low in order to preserve its reputation and obtain a
higher payo from propaganda when the stakes are high. Hence, variability of stakes
creates a channel through which the client can benet from the improved incentives
of the expert. In this section, we present an example in which the ex-ante expected
probability of correct decision by the client is greater under no disclosure than under
disclosure.
Let the stake of the interest group, , be a realization of a random variable
distributed identically and independently across periods, with support f0;g. Let 
denote the probability that  = 0. The value of  is realized at the beginning of
each period and is observed by each player. The rest of the model is unchanged. The
13solution concept is stationary Markov perfect equilibrium, in which the Markov state
is the client's belief about the type of the expert and the realization of stake, .
In the model with disclosure, the expert cannot obtain a positive access fee.
Hence, the variability in the stakes of the interest groups does not aect the incentives
of the expert. As a result, Lemmas 1 and 2 characterizing equilibria in the original
model continue to hold.
We now turn to the model without disclosure. We assume that the prior reputa-
tion of the expert is greater than p. This assumption signicantly simplies analysis:











Remark 7. Let c 2 (q;~ c]. The ex-ante expected probability of correct decision is
greater under no disclosure if  > p and
 >
q(1   q   (1   q))






(1   q)(1   )
1   q
:
We rst prove the following observation:
(*) Let ~ c  c  ~ c. Then, there exists an equilibrium in which the
expert with reputation p > p investigates with probability 1 if  = 0 and
probability 0 if  = .
To prove (*), observe that, in any continuation game in which the expert has
reputation zero, her choosing propaganda and collecting zero fees is a unique station-
ary equilibrium. Now, consider an expert with reputation p > p. In equilibrium, she
collects the access fee of 0 if  = 0 and (1   q) if  = . Furthermore, her service
fees are q if  = 0 and 2q  1+p(1 q) if  = . As a result, the payo of the expert
with reputation p > p along the equilibrium path can be expressed as
v(p) = (q   c + v(p)) + (1   )(2q   1 + p(1   q) + (1   q) + qv(p))
=
(q   c) + (1   )(2q   1 + p(1   q) + (1   q))
1    + (1   )(1   q)
:
14The condition c  ~ c ensures that the net benet of investigation is non-negative if
 = 0,
L(p;1) =  c + (1   q)v(p)  0: (p > p
)
At the same time, the condition c  ~ c ensures that the net benet of investigation
is non-positive if  = ,
L(p;0) =  c   (1   q) + (1   q)v(1)  0;
which establishes (*).
By (3), q < ~ c. Then, by (*), for any c 2 (q;~ c], investigation is impossible
in equilibrium under disclosure but there exists an equilibrium under no disclosure
in which investigation occurs with certainty if  = 0. The expected probability of
correct decision in each period under disclosure is equal to
disclosure = p0 + (1   p0)(1   q):
Under no disclosure, the probability of correct decision depends on the history of
realizations of  and . The strategic expert maintains its reputation as long as there
has not been a period in which  = 0 and  = ; the corresponding probability of
correct decision is equal to
no disclosure = p0 + (1   p0)( + (1   )q):
After the period in which  = 0 and  = 1, the type of the expert is revealed to
the client and the probability of the correct decision coincides with the one under
disclosure. We conclude that whenever no disclosure > disclosure or, equivalently,
 > p

the ex-ante expected probability of correct decision is greater under no disclosure.
3.2 Long-Lived Interest Groups
In certain settings, the same interest group has repeated interactions with the expert.
Therefore, the expert and the interest group may play equilibria that make use of
information available only to them, but not the client. In this subsection, we analyze
whether this possibility results in equilibria where the expert investigates frequently
enough such that the probability of making a correct decision under nondisclosure is
higher than under disclosure.
15In the discussion below, we construct an equilibrium under nondisclosure in which
the expert and the interest group use a coordination device to ensure the expert
investigates with a high probability, even if the expert has reputation one. If the
expert fails to investigate as prescribed, she is punished by being paid lowered access
fees thereafter. If the interest group fails to punish the expert, it is punished by being
forced to pay higher access fees to the expert thereafter. The investigation probability
can be chosen high enough such that the decision maker chooses the correct decision
more frequently than under disclosure.
Remark 8. There exist values of  and c such that there is an equilibrium in which the
expert with reputation p = 1 investigates with a probability r  p and, as a result,
the probability of the client taking the optimal action is higher than the disclosure
case.
Proof. Let us consider the following strategy prole: every period there is a draw of
a Bernoulli random variable, which is only observable to the expert and the interest
group. If its realization is 1, the expert investigates when its realization is 1; if its
realization is 0, she approaches the interest group, asks for an access fee, and publishes
its propaganda if the interest group pays the access fee. Let us assume the realization
1 occurs with probability r  p. This ensures that the client takes the correct
action with higher probability than under disclosure, where the strategic expert is
completely ignored.
We also introduce two phases: pro-expert phase and pro-interest group phase,
diering only in the amount of access fee paid by the interest group each period if
the expert is supposed to approach the interest group.
 Pro-expert phase. In this phase, the expert asks for an access fee equal to the
full surplus (1 q) and the interest group accepts any access fee lower than or
equal to this amount.
 Pro-interest group phase. In this phase, the expert asks for an access fee equal
to (1   q)   x, where 0  x  (1   q); and the interest group accepts any
access fee lower than or equal to this amount.
We consider the following strategy prole as a candidate for equilibrium. Note
that the expert's probability of investigation in either phase is r  p. Simple calcu-
lation yields that the expert should charge a service fee of q   (1   p)(1   r)(1   q).
 The expert and the interest group start in the pro-expert phase.
16 They start the pro-interest group phase if the expert deviates from her pre-
scribed action.
 They start the pro-expert phase if the interest group deviates from its prescribed
action.
Let vc(p) be the continuation payo of the expert with reputation p in the pro-
expert phase, and vd(p) be her payo in the pro-interest group phase. Let wc(p) and
wd(p) be the payos of the interest group. We focus on the case p = 1. Since the
expert's reputation will remain one as long as her report matches the state of the
world, we can write
v
c(1) = q + r[ c + v
c(1)] + (1   r)[(1   q) + qv
c(1)];
v
d(1) = q + r[ c + v





(1   r)(1   q) + q   rc




(1   r)(1   q) + q   rc   (1   r)x
1   q   (1   q)r
:






1   q   (1   q)r
:
The incentive conditions that have to be satised include no deviations by the expert
or the interest group in either phase. In the pro-interest group phase, the utility of the
expert must be the same from investigation and propaganda, since the \punishment"
for deviation is to continue the punishment phase. We obtain




where c is as dened in Section 2. Note that this condition also ensures that the
expert would not deviate from propaganda to investigation in the pro-expert phase,
since in the pro-expert phase the continuation payo for deviation to investigation is
the same as in the pro-interest group phase while the payo for sticking to propaganda
is higher. To deter deviation by the expert from investigation to propaganda in the
pro-expert phase, we need




17To ensure that both of the above conditions hold, we need




1 + q(1   r)
:
It is straightforward to check that this condition also guarantees that the interest
group will not deviate in the pro-interest group phase and accept an oer that gives
it less than x. Further, the interest group has no incentive to deviate in the pro-expert
phase, as regardless of what it does, it cannot earn a payo higher than zero. Finally,
we need to require that x be small enough such that vd(1)  0.
Indeed, when r = p, we can nd values of , c, and x that satisfy all the
conditions, the inequalities strictly. By continuity, there exists r > p that satisfy all
the conditions.
For other reputation levels, we can nd conditions such that the expert is induced
to investigate, though we also need to vary x according to the expert's reputation.
3.3 Growing clientele
In this subsection, let us suppose the size of the clientele of the expert grows as
her reputation increases. Higher reputation enhances not only the expert's persua-
siveness, but also her exposure. Compared to the benchmark model, she has extra
incentives to build reputation: a larger clientele means rst a larger base to collect
subscription fees; it means also higher access fees from the interest group as she now
has wider in
uence. Thus, she is more inclined to choose investigation. We now pro-
vide an illustration that such concerns may cause the expert to investigate frequently
enough to make her client's decision more likely to be correct under nondisclosure.
Let 1 + (p) be the client base of an expert of reputation p, where  is nonde-
creasing in p. We assume that the expert's service fee and access fee are proportional
to her client base.
Given this modication, a reputation-one expert nds it optimal to investigate
if and only if
c  ^ c 
(1   q)q[1 + (1)]
1   q
 
(1   q)(1   )[1 + (1)]
1   q
:
18Meanwhile, a reputation-zero expert nds it optimal to always choose propaganda
if and only if
c  ^ c
 
(1   q)q[1 + (1)]
1   q
+
(1   q)2[1 + (1)]
1   q
:
Following what we do in the benchmark model, let c 2 (^ c;^ c).
Remark 9. Let  be large enough such that [1 + (1)]q < ^ c and let c 2 ([1 +
(1)]q;^ c). In addition, let
(p) =
(
0; p   p;
1; p <  p;
where  p = 1=(2   p). Then, there exist values of  and  large enough such that
an expert of reputation p 2 [p;  p) investigates with probability r  p. Therefore,
when p 2 [p;  p), the probability of the client taking the correct action is higher under
nondisclosure than under disclosure.
Proof. In the case of disclosure, a reputation-p expert investigates if and only if
c  [1 + (p)]q:
Note that, for p = 1, this threshold is lower than ^ c for large enough  and always
higher than ^ c. Since we assume c > [1+(1)]q, a strategic expert never investigates
under disclosure.
Recall that r is the probability of investigation by the strategic expert. The
probabilities of correct decisions by the client for an expert of reputation p are re-
spectively 1   (1   p)(1   q)(1   r) for nondisclosure and 1   (1   p)q for disclosure.
The former is higher if r  p.
Similarly to our benchmark model, for c 2 (^ c;^ c), it is never the case that
an expert always investigates. To see this, note that a reputation-p expert always
investigates if and only if
c  ^ c(p) 
(1   q)q[1 + (p)]
1   q
 
(1   q)(1   )[1 + (p)]
1   q
:
But, the above expression is either negative, or less than ^ c. In either case, a
reputation-p expert would not nd investigation optimal as we assume c > 0 and
c > ^ c.
Recall that p is the reputation level above which an expert's report is followed
even if the strategic expert never investigates. In the benchmark model, an expert
19with reputation higher than p always chooses propaganda. However, in the modied
model, such an expert always chooses propaganda if and only if
c  ^ c
(p) 
(1   q)q[1 + (1)]
1   q
+ (1   q)
(1   q)[1 + (1)]   (1   q)[1 + (p)]
1   q
:
This threshold is larger than ^ c = ^ c(1) = ^ c(1). As a result, the assumption that
c > ^ c is not sucient to imply that an expert with reputation higher than p always
chooses propaganda. The reason is that by switching to investigation from propa-
ganda, the expert maximizes her client base if she makes a correct report in state 0,
which may imply next period's access fee dominates the current period's. It is possi-
ble, therefore, for an expert with reputation higher than p to choose investigation,
though it is still the case that an expert with reputation close to one always chooses
propaganda.
Since c  ^ c and (p) = (1) for all p   p, it is straightforward to show that an
expert of reputation p   p always chooses propaganda. Thus, for p   p,
v(p) =
[1 + (p)][q   (1   q)(1   p) + (1   q)]
1   q
:
We have argued that the expert never investigates with probability one in equilibrium
regardless of her reputation. Now, for p 2 [p;  p), in order for the expert to mix
between investigation and propaganda, we have
c + [1 + (p)](1   q) = (1   q)v(p
0); (4)
where p0 is the expert's updated reputation after reporting 0 truthfully. As before,
the left hand side represents the expert's cost of investigation, while the right hand




p + (1   p)p =  p:
Now, substituting p = p and r = p (hence p0 =  p) into the incentive condition and




[[1 + ( p)]q   [1 + ( p)](1    p)(1   q)] =
[1 + ( p)](1   q)   (1   q)
1   q
:
Substituting ( p) = (1) = 1 into the above equation, we can see that the left hand
side is strictly positive. In addition, as long as  > 1=(2   q), there exists  > 0
satisfying the above equation.
20Fix  = . Now, consider p 2 (p;  p). We claim that the expert must investigate
with probability r > p. Suppose r  p. As p0 is increasing in p and decreasing in
r, p0 >  p. Since (p) = 0 for all p <  p and v(p0) is strictly increasing for p0   p, the
right hand side of (4) is higher but the left hand side remains unchanged. Therefore,
we must increase r, thereby decrease p0, to make it hold.
To summarize, in equilibrium, the expert investigates with probability r  p for
p 2 [p;  p), which implies the client takes the correct action with higher probability
under nondisclosure than under disclosure.
4 Discussion: Behavioral type
Our results rely on the existence of a non-strategic type that always acquires infor-
mation, regardless of the amount of service and access fees, and never attempts to
separate itself from the other type.13 We view this type as a convenient modeling
shortcut for a strategic type who either has a lower cost of investigation or experi-
ences a positive utility from reporting truthfully to the client. This section makes
this argument precise. In addition, we also compare our model against a model in
which there exists only the strategic expert.
4.1 High and low cost
Let us consider a model in which there are two types of experts that have dierent
costs of investigation, c and c, where c < c < c < c. Again, the client is uncertain
about the type of the expert. The rest of the model is identical to the one considered
in the previous sections.
Remark 10. There exists an equilibrium in which the low-cost type always investigates
and reports truthfully and the high-cost type behaves as prescribed in the previous
sections.
Proof. For low values of reputation, in the original model an expert with cost between
c and c is indierent between propaganda and costly investigation. Hence, in the
13The equilibrium prescribes that the honest and strategic types charge the same service fee.
This equilibrium can be supported by the stipulation that the client interprets any other service fee
charged by the expert as a signal that the expert is of the strategic type. Then, neither type would
want to deviate from the equilibrium service fee.
21new model, the expert with low cost strictly prefers investigation. It remains to check
that for p  p, the low cost expert prefers to investigate, that is,





is the value of reputation 1 for the expert with low cost.14
A sucient condition for (5) to hold for any p  p is that this inequality holds
for the highest possible access fee,  = (1   q), that is,




which is equivalent to c  c.
The equilibrium in the model with the truthful type can now be replicated if we
assign (out-of-equilibrium) beliefs to the client that the expert has high cost whenever
the service fee is dierent from the service fee prescribed in the original game.
4.2 Absence of Honest Type
Our model has two crucial features: uncertainty about the source of the report and
the possibility of a truthful expert. Throughout the paper, we have compared the
results in our model with the benchmark case in which the source of the report is
known. In particular, there are circumstances under which investigation is impossible
if the source of the report is always disclosed and is possible otherwise.
A similar result holds with respect to the possibility of a truthful expert. The
set of costs for which non-zero probability of investigation is possible is smaller in
the model without the possibility of the truthful type. This is because in the absence
of the truthful type, the expert does not have a means to build its reputation and
become in
uential. Hence, although introducing uncertainty about the credibility of
the expert may not improve the payo of the expert, it aects it behavior. This
discussion is made formal by the following result, which uses sequential equilibrium
as the solution concept.
Remark 11. When the expert is always strategic, investigation is possible in equilib-
rium if and only if c  c.
14Note that the high-cost type never investigates when p  p and hence the expert's reputation
becomes 1 after investigation in low state.
22Proof. If the expert chooses investigation with non-zero probability in any period, it
must be that
(1   q) + qv
1 + (1   q)v
0   c + qv
1 + (1   q)v
0;
where v1, v0, and v0 are respectively the expert's continuation payos after a correct
report in state 1, a correct report in state 0, and an incorrect report (in state 0), or,
equivalently,
c   (1   q) + (1   q)(v
0   v
0):














In this section, we provide a concise survey of the related literature.15
Reputational cheap talk. Sobel's [64] studies a repeated game of reputational
cheap-talk between an expert and a decision maker.16 Our model can be viewed as
an extension of his, where we allow the bias of the expert to arise endogenously and
vary over time. We also make endogenous the expert's information. Durbin and Iyer
[23] study a static model of a reputational cheap-talk between an expert, who may
receive an unobservable payment from a third party aected by the decision, and
a decision maker. Our model can be viewed as an extension of their model, where
we make explicit the origin and the form of the value of reputation by considering a
dynamic model. In addition, we endogenize information available to the expert.
There are a number of other papers exploring eects of reputation on cheap-
talk communication. B enabou and Laroque [8], for example, further develop Sobel's
model by allowing the expert to have imperfect information. Reputation concerns due
to experts' preferences are also studied by Frisell and Lagerl of [30], Morris [53], and
15There is a large literature started by the seminal work of Crawford and Sobel [18] that analyzes
cheap-talk communication between an expert(s) and a decision maker(s). We refer the reader to the
surveys of the literature in Krishna and Morgan [46] and Ganguly and Ray [35].
16Wei Li [49] presents a model of reputational cheap-talk similar in spirit to the one in Sobel [64].
She focuses on comparing direct communication and communication through a strategic, possibly
biased, intermediary.
23i Vidal [42].17 Tsuyuhara [67] and Wrasai and Swank [69] present models in which
reputational concerns due to experts' preferences interact with career concerns, as the
decision maker has an option of ring the expert. In papers of Bourjade and Jullien
[11], Li [48], Mariano [51], and Ottaviani and Sorensen [56] [57] [58], the decision
maker is uncertain about how informed the expert is. Olszewski [55] considers the
case where the expert would like to appear honest. Fisher and Heinkel [27] present
an innitely repeated model in which the expert is a nancial analyst and there is
uncertainty about the amount of perks she consumes in a given period (her type).
Unlike in the rest of the literature, the expert's type is not xed but evolves over time.
In papers by Kim [44], Park [60], and Stocken [65], there is complete information about
the type of the sender and reputation is interpreted as choosing among equilibrium
paths.
The main focus of this literature is to study the amount of information trans-
mission and identify the eect of reputational concerns on the expert's incentives to
convey information truthfully. Often, the message is negative: reputational concerns
motivate the expert to distort her reports towards the expectations of the decision
maker to ensure that her reputation does not suer. In contrast, in this paper we add
information acquisition into the picture. We are interested in whether reputational
concerns, absent disclosure, are sucient to create proper incentives for the expert to
acquire information.
Information acquisition. Our paper is concerned with the issue of information
acquisition by experts, so it is also related to the literature on designing mechanisms to
improve information acquisition. Szalay [66] studies a principal-agent model where the
agent has to collect information before taking an action.18 He shows that the principal
may nd it optimal to limit the agent's freedom of choice so as to improve incentives
for information acquisition. Dewatripont and Tirole [21] show that competing biased
experts have stronger incentives to collect information than a single unbiased expert.
Che and Kartik [14], Dur and Swank [22], and Gerardi and Yariv [38] model experts
as agents who both collect and transmit information. A common theme in these
papers is that it might be optimal to hire experts with preferences dierent from the
17Ely and V alim aki [25] demonstrate that a long-lived expert with preferences aligned with his
clients may nevertheless fail to provide service to one-shot clients, due to reputation concerns of
not appearing opportunistic. Our model is, however, a \good-reputation" model, in the sense that
reputation concerns induce experts to acquire more information.
18For further references, see survey of the literature on information acquisition in mechanism
design by Bergemann and V alim aki [9].
24decision maker in order to improve incentives to acquire information.19
Reputational concerns and information acquisition. In a model quite distant from
ours, Iossa [43] combines reputational concerns about the ability to collect information
of the arbitrator (expert) with information acquisition. The message of that paper
is that reputational concerns may improve incentives to acquire information while
making information transmission more dicult, which in turn has implication for the
decision of the interested parties whether to use the arbitrator rather than resort to
litigation.
Media. An earlier version of our paper has been circulated under the title \In-
dierent Public, Passionate Advocates, and Strategic Media." (See [47].) In that
version, we interpreted the expert as a media outlet who provides news to the public
(decision maker) and can be captured by a special interest group. A growing liter-
ature explores a variety of models in which media outlets have incentives to distort
their news reports.20 Besley and Prat [10], for example, assume that media outlets
can be bought by the government to suppress bad news. In their model, information
is veriable, although there is uncertainty about whether the media outlets have any
information. Moreover, there are no reputation concerns. Anderson and McLaren [4]
analyze incentives for competing media outlets to merge and, in particular, the ef-
fects of mergers on the information reported to the public. Mullainathan and Shleifer
[54] assume that readers have a preference for news that conrms their prior beliefs
and, in equilibrium, media outlets choose to slant their news accordingly. Gentzkow
and Shapiro [36] present a reputation model in which there is uncertainty about the
quality of the information possessed by a media outlet. They show that reputation
concerns might drive the media outlet to distort news in favor of readers' prior beliefs.
Burke [12] shows that media outlets' reputational concerns about appearing ideolog-
ically unbiased may prevent them from transmitting information to their audience.
Our contribution to this literature is an explicit model of reputation dynamics of a
media outlet (expert) under the possibility of capture and an analysis of the impact
of dierent disclosure policies on the quality of information supplied by the media
outlet.
Two-sided markets. Finally, the expert in our model can be interpreted as a
19A number of other models allow for information acquisition. For instance, Aghion and Tirole [1]
study a question of the interaction between real and formal authority in which the agent can choose
the amount of eort to acquire information. Ozerturk [59] focuses on the optimal incentive scheme
for a nancial analyst, who can be trading on her own account, and has a choice about how much
information to acquire.
20Gentzkow and Shapiro [37] provide a survey of the literature.
25platform in a two-sided market, which brings together the interest group and the
public, and hence is indirectly connected with the recent work on media as a two-
sided market.21
6 Conclusions
In this paper, we present a dynamic model of information acquisition and transmis-
sion by a prot-maximizing expert whose credibility is uncertain to the client. We
characterize the equilibrium structure of information transmission with and without
disclosure of the source of the expert's report. In particular, we demonstrate that
absence of disclosure may create incentives for the strategic expert to choose costly
investigation in the hope of improving her reputation. Nevertheless, in the bench-
mark model the client cannot benet from more informative reports as they serve the
goal of confusing the client and making the reports by the interest group more eec-
tive. We then demonstrate that a number of factors - varying stakes of the interest
group, growing clientele of the expert, and long-lived interest group - may reverse this
conclusion.
We obtain these results in a model with many specic assumptions. The benet
of this approach is that it allows us to sketch our arguments more explicitly than it
would be possible in a more reduced form model. On the other hand, one worries
about the robustness of results. We consider multiple extensions and perform many
robustness checks in the working paper (Li and Mylovanov [47]). Here, we brie
y
discuss some results and caveats. First, our results are robust to competition among
experts, some modications of the assumptions on preferences and the timing of the
model, and the introduction of a possibility for the expert to keep silent after collecting
the fees. Second, note that our model is not a cheap-talk one. In particular, the expert
cannot make up reports and has to obtain them either through investigation or from
the interest group. Relaxing this assumption changes the structure of equilibria; we
do not know how the possibility of cheap-talk aects our conclusions about the eects
of non-dsclosure.
21Some of the recent contributions in this literature are Anderson and Coate [2], Choi [15], Cram-
pes, Haritchabalet, and Jullien [17], Cunningham and Alexander [20], Ferrando, Gabszewicz, Laussel,
and Sonnac [26], Gabszewicz, Laussel, and Sonnac [31] [32] [33], Gal-Or and Dukes [34], Germano
[24], and Peitz and Valletti [61]. In addition, an overview of the two-sided approach to media markets
is provided by Anderson and Gabszewicz [3]. Finally, for a survey of the economics of advertise-
ment including prior literature, see Bagwell [6]. For a general analysis of two-sided markets see, for
example, Armstrong [5] and Rochet and Tirole [63] and their references.
26In our model, with probability one the decision maker learns the type of the
expert in nite time. Hence, the reputation of the expert is impermanent and so are
the eects created by the uncertainty about the expert's type.22 There are several
natural modication of the models that can remedy this problem. For example, we
can assume that the type of the expert can change with a small probability in each
period. This would create a possibility of rebuilding reputation even after the expert
has given incorrect advice.23 We can also consider a model in which the decision
maker, who, recall, is a myopic player, observes a truncated history of play. In this
model, the expert who is revealed to be strategic might have a chance to rebuild her
reputation after a period of time. We do not pursue hese alternatives in the current
paper and leave them for future research.
Another special aspect of our model is that we assume the expert's investigation
technology to be perfect, and that the client learns the true state of the nature with
certainty after each period. As a result, once a strategic expert's report fails to match
the true state of the nature, it is fully exposed and deprived of any reputation. This
is an assumption that greatly simplies the analysis. Though in this paper we do
not explore the relaxation of these assumptions, we believe the underlying tradeo
between building reputation and cashing it in, with corresponding implications for
the client's welfare, and the implications for the desirability of disclosure policy, is
present in reality and can be captured within alternative, more general, models.
A Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. Existence. Let






n ~ z(1   q)
1   q
; n 2 f0;1;:::g


















22This is a general feature of reputation models with adverse selection and imperfect monitoring
(Cripps, Mailath, and Samuleson [19]).
23The models of reputation in which the type of the players follows a stochastic process have been
considered by Holmstrom [41], Cole, Dow, and English [16], Mailath and Samuelson [?], Phelan [62],
and Wiesman [68].
27The following set of strategies, together with corresponding Bayesian beliefs, is
an equilibrium: The expert chooses investigation with probability given by (2). The
client always pays the service fee and follows low report. Furthermore, if p > p,
he follows high report. If p = (p)n and p  ~ p, the client follows high report with





(1 q) . If p < ~ p, the client ignores high report and chooses 0.
The service fee is 0 if p  p and equal to q   (1   p)(1   q) otherwise. The access
fee is z(1   q), where z is the probability that the client follows high report.
It is direct to show that if the expert follows her strategy, she obtains the payo
given by (1). Furthermore, the payo of the expert with reputation p = ((p)n),
n 2 f1;:::g, is equal to
v(p) = maxff(z
;n);0g: (6)
The optimality of the fees and the client's behavior is straightforward. Moreover,
it is optimal for the expert with reputation 0 to choose propaganda because her rep-
utation cannot increase after investigation. Now, consider the expert with reputation
p > p. If the expert chooses investigation, her reputation will be 1, implying v0 = v.
Furthermore, the client always follows the reports and hence (p;r) = (1;0) for any
r 2 [0;1]. This implies that L(p;r) < 0, making propaganda optimal.
Next, assume that the expert has reputation p 2 ((p)n+1;(p)n), n = 1;:::; such









Furthermore, the probability with which the client follows high report, z, satises






or, equivalently, L(p;r) = 0, implying that the expert is indierent about her choice.
The argument for p = (p)n, n = 1;:::, p > ~ p; and for p < ~ p is analogous.
Uniqueness. We now prove the second part of the proposition. First, we calculate
the service fees in any equilibrium. If pt  p and rt  r(pt), the expert does not
investigate frequently enough to make her reports valuable for the client, in which
case (pt;rt) = 0. On the other hand, if pt  p and rt > r(pt) or if pt > p, the
client will nd reports informative, in which the service fee is (pt;rt) = 2q 1+(pt+
(1   pt)rt)(1   q):
The access fees depend on how frequently the client follows high report of the
expert,  = ~ z(1   q), where ~ z is the probability that the client takes action 1 after
28report 1. In equilibrium, ~ z is equal to 0 if pt  p and rt < r(pt), is any number
between 0 and 1 if pt  p and rt = r(pt), and is 1 otherwise.
Next, observe that, in any continuation game in which the expert has reputation
zero, choosing propaganda and collecting zero fees is the unique stationary equilib-
rium.
We now calculate the continuation payo of the expert with reputation 1, v.
First, reputation 1 implies that the fees are (1;r) = q and (1;r) = (1   q) for
any value of r. If the expert chooses investigation, her reputation will remain 1 and,
therefore, her expected payo is equal to
v
0 =  c + q + v:
If, on the other hand, the expert chooses propaganda, she will lose her reputation
whenever the state is 0, which happens with probability q. In this case, her expected
payo is
v
00 = (1   q) + q + (1   q)v:




(1   q) + q
1   q
;
implying that the expert will choose propaganda and L(1;0) < 0. The value of v pro-
vides the upper bound on the continuation payo of the expert with any reputation.
Let us now consider an expert with reputation p 2 (p;1). Because v0  v and
(p;r) = (1;0) for any r 2 [0;1], we have L(p;r) < 0. Thus, the expert will choose
propaganda. As a result, the payo of the expert is given by
v(p) =
(p +    1)(1   q) + q
1   q
:
If p = p, then L(p;r) < 0 for all r 2 (0;1] and hence the expert with this
reputation will never choose costly investigation. For r = 0 to be optimal, we need
the client to follow high reports with probability z(p)  z0, which gives L(p;0)  0.
Thus, the value of reputation is given by (1) if p > p and f(z(p);0) if p = p.
This implies that in any equilibrium the following properties are satised, with k = 0:
(i) The value of reputation is given by (1) for p 2 ((p)n+1;(p)n) and equal to
maxff(z(p);n);0g for p = (p)n+1 for all n = 0;:::;k;
(ii) The probability of investigation satises (2) for p 2 [(p)k+1;1].
29The rest of the proof is by induction. We will show that if (i) and (ii) are satised
in any equilibrium for k = i, then it is also satised in any equilibrium for k = i + 1.
First, let p < p. Observe that if the client expects the expert to always choose
propaganda, r = 0, then a deviation to investigation will convince the client that the
expert is truthful, implying v0 = v. It follows then that L(p;0) > 0, as c < c and
(p;0) = 0. Therefore, in equilibrium the expert does not always choose propaganda.
On the other hand, for all r > r(p), we have L(p;r)  L(1;0) < 0. Hence, in
equilibrium the expert cannot choose investigative journalism with probability greater
than r(p).
Now, consider the expert with p 2 ((p)i+2;(p)i+1). Let p  ~ p. Note that if
the expert chooses investigation with probability r < r(p), her reputation after a





















Therefore, the expert would prefer to investigate with probability 1 > r(p). This
shows that r(p) is the unique value for which L(p;r) = 0 is possible.
Let now p < ~ p. Observe that in this case, L(p;r(p)) < 0 and therefore r(p) <
r(p). The probability of investigation is determined by L(p;r(p)) = 0, which is
equivalent to
 c = (1   q)v(p
0(p;r)): (7)
The value v(p0(p;r)) is decreasing in r on (0;r(p)]. Therefore, (7) has at most one
solution. By construction of ~ p, r = r(p) is a solution. The argument for p = (p)n,
n = 1;:::, is analogous.
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